Infrastructure networks are vulnerable to both cyber and physical a acks. Building a secure and resilient networked system is essential for providing reliable and dependable services. To this end, we establish a two-player three-stage game framework to capture the dynamics in the infrastructure protection and recovery phases. Speci cally, the goal of the infrastructure network designer is to keep the network connected before and a er the a ack, while the adversary aims to disconnect the network by compromising a set of links. With costs for creating and removing links, the two players aim to maximize their utilities while minimizing the costs. In this paper, we use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) to characterize the optimal strategies of the network defender and attacker. We derive the SPE explicitly in terms of system parameters. Finally, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery to corroborate the obtained analytical results.
INTRODUCTION
Infrastructure networks are increasingly connected due to the integration of the information and communications technologies (ICTs). For example, the introduction of smart meters has enabled the communications between the users and the utility companies. Communications with roadside units in vehicular networks can provide safety warnings and tra c information.
However, infrastructure networks are vulnerable to not only physical a acks (e.g., terrorism, the or vandalisms) but also cyber a acks. ese a acks can damage the connectivity of the infrastructure system and thus results in the performance degradation and operational dysfunction. For instance, an adversary can a ack the road sensor units and create tra c congestion [1] . As a result, the transportation system can break down due to the loss of roads. An adversary can also launch denial-of-service a acks to disconnect communication networks [2] , resulting in inaccessibility of relevant database for air travel or nancial transactions.
e cyber-physical nature of the infrastructure can also enable the coordinated a acks on the infrastructure systems that allow an adversary to use both cyber and physical approaches to disconnect networks. erefore, infrastructure protection plays a signi cant role to maintain the connectivity of the infrastructure networks. One way to protect the network is to create redundant links in the network so that networks can be still connected despite arbitrary removal of links. is approach has been used in tra c networks by creating multiple modes of transportation, in communication networks by adding extra wired or wireless links, and in supply chain networks by making orders from multiple suppliers.
Adding link redundancy is an e ective approach when there is no knowledge of the target of the a acker, and thus the objective of the network designer is to secure the network by making the network robust to arbitrary removal of a xed number of links. However, it becomes expensive and sometimes prohibitive when the cost for creating links is costly, and the a acker is powerful. erefore, a paradigm shi to emphasize the recovery and response to a acks is critical, and the infrastructure resilience becomes essential for developing post-a ack mechanisms to mitigate the impacts. With a limited budget of resources, it is essential to develop an optimal posta ack healing mechanism as well as a pre-a ack secure mechanism holistically and understand the fundamental tradeo s between security and resilience in the infrastructures.
To this end, we establish a two-player dynamic three-stage network game formation problem in which the infrastructure network designer aims to keep the network connected before and a er the a ack, while the objective of the adversary is to keep the network disconnected a er the a ack. Note that each player has a cost on creating or removing links. Speci cally, at the rst stage of the game, the infrastructure network designer rst creates a network with necessary redundancies by anticipating the impact of adversarial behavior. en, an adversary a acks at the second stage by removing a minimum number of links of the network. At the last stage of the game, the network designer can recover the network a er the a ack by adding extra links to the a acked network.
e resilience of the network is characterized by the capability of the network to maintain connectivity a er the a ack and the time it takes to heal the network. e security of the infrastructure is characterized by the capability of the network to withstand the a ack before healing. Adding a large number of redundancies to the network can prevent the a ack from disconnecting the network, but this approach can be costly. Hence, it is important to make strategic decisions and planning to yield a protection and recovery mechanism for the infrastructure with a minimum cost.
We adopt subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPE) as the solution concept of the dynamic game. We observe that with su cient capabilities of recovery, the infrastructure can mitigate the threats by reducing the incentives of the a ackers. We analyze SPE of the game by investigating two di erent parameter regimes. Further, we develop an optimal post-a ack network healing strategy to recover the infrastructure network. When an a acker is powerful (a ack cost is low), we observe that the defender needs to allocate more resources in securing the network to reduce the incentives of the a acker. In addition, agile resilience and fast response to a acks are critical in mitigating the cyber threats in the infrastructures.
Related Works: Security is a critical concern for infrastructure networks [3, 4] . e method in our work is relevant to the recent advances in adversarial networks [5, 6] and network formation games [7, 8] . In particular, we jointly design the optimal protection and recovery strategies for infrastructure networks.
Organization of the Paper: e rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formulates the problem. Dynamic game analysis are presented in Section 3. Section 4 derives the SPE of the dynamic game. Case studies are given in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
DYNAMIC GAME FORMULATION
In this section, we consider an infrastructure system represented by a set N of n nodes.
e infrastructure designer can design a network with redundant links before the a ack for protection and adding new links a er the a ack for recovery.
e sequence of the actions taken by the designer and the a acker is described as follows:
• A Designer (D) aims to create a network between these nodes and protect it against a malicious a ack; • A er some time of operation, an Adversary (A) puts an a ack on the network by removing a subset of its links; • Once the D realizes that an a ack has been conducted, it has the opportunity to heal its network by constructing new links (or reconstructing some destroyed ones). In addition, the timing of the actions also play a signi cant role in determining the optimal strategies of both players. We normalize the horizon of the event from the start of the preparation of infrastructure protection to a time point of interest as the time internal [0, 1]. is normalization is motivated by the observation made in [9] where the consequences of een major storms occurring between 2004 and 2012 are plo ed over a normalized duration of the event. We let τ and τ R represent, respectively, the fraction of time spent before the a ack (system is fully operational) and between the a ack and the healing phase. is is illustrated in Figure 1 .
A ack Recovery e goal of the designer or the defender is to create protection and recovery mechanisms to keep its network operational, i.e., connected in this case. Let E 1 be the set of links created by the defender initially (i.e. at time 0). E A ⊆ E 1 is the set of links removed (a acked) by the adversary and E 2 is the set of links created by the defender a er the a ack (at fraction τ + τ R of the time horizon). Regardless of the time stamp, creating (resp. removing) links has a unitary cost c D (resp. c A ). e adversary aims to disconnect the network. us, for any set E, we de ne 1 E which equals 1 if the graph (N, E) is connected and 0 otherwise. Values τ , τ R , c A and c D are common knowledge to both the Designer and the Adversary. As a tie-breaker rule, assume that if the output is the same for the Adversary, the Adversary chooses to a ack the network with the strongest number of link removals. Similarly, the Designer chooses not to create links if its utility is the same. erefore, the utility for the designer (resp. adversary) is equal to the fraction of time the network is connected (resp. disconnected) minus the costs of creating (resp. removing) the links. Hence the payo functions of the designer and the adversary are represented by U D and U A , respectively, as follows:
where | · | denotes the cardinality of a set.
As the players are strategic, we study the SPE and analyze the strategies of the players to the sets (E 1 , E A , E 2 ).
us, we seek triplets (E 1 , E A , E 2 ) such that E 2 is a best response to (E 1 , E A ) and that given E 1 , (E A , E 2 ) is also a SPE. In other words, the SPE involves the analysis of the following three sequentially nested problems starting from the last stage of the designer's recovery problem to the rst stage of the designer's protection problem:
). e equilibrium solution (E 1 , E A , E 2 ) that solves the above three problems consistently is an SPE of the two-player dynamic game.
GAME ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the possible con gurations of the infrastructure network at SPE.
We rst note that c A should be not too large, since otherwise A cannot be a threat to D. Similarly, c D should be su ciently small so that the D can create a connected network:
n−1 , then D has no incentive to create a connected network.
P
. Suppose that c A > 1 − τ . Let E 1 be given and B := τ (1 − 1 E 1 ). If A decides not to remove any link, then its payo is
us, it is a best response for A to play
its utility is 0. Otherwise, its utility is bounded above by 1 − (n − 1)c D which corresponds to a connected tree network with the minimum number of links.
In the following, we thus suppose that c A < 1 − τ and c D < 1 n−1 . Note that the SPE can correspond only to a set of situations:
is an SPE. en, we are necessarily in one of the situations given in Table 1 .
. Altogether, 8 situations should be possible. However,
erefore, the situations where
All other combinations are summarized in Table 1. e shape of the SPE depends on the values of the parameters of the game. In particular, it depends on whether the D has incentive to fully reconstruct (heal) the system a er an a ack of the A. More precisely, if 1 − τ − τ R > (n − 1)c D , then the D prefers to heal the network even if all links have been compromised by the a acker. Otherwise, there should be a minimum number of links remained a er the a ack for the D to heal the network at the SPE. We analyze these two cases in Sections 4.1 and 4.2, respectively.
SPE ANALYSIS OF THE GAME
Depending on the parameters, we derive SPE of the game in two regimes: 1 − τ − τ R > (n − 1)c D and the otherwise.
Regime
In the case where 1 − τ − τ R > (n − 1)c D , the network always recovers to be connected a er the a ack. e potential SPE can occur in only three of the Situations in Table 1 . More precisely:
. en, the SPE of the game is unique and satis es:
, then the SPE satis es
Proposition 4.1 is a direct consequence of the following lemma:
e potential SPEs have the properties given in Table 2 . 
).
P . First note that any connected network contains at least n − 1 links. Conversely, any set of nodes can be made connected by using exactly n − 1 links (any spanning tree is a solution). We consider a situation where 1 E 1 \E A = 0. en, either D decides not to heal the network and receives a utility of U * = τ 1 E 1 − c D |E 1 |, or it decides to heal it (by using at most n − 1 links) and receives a utility of at least
us, D always prefers to heal the network a er the a ack of A. erefore, Situations 3 and 5 contain no SPE.
Next we consider Situation 4. Since 1 E 1 \E A ∪E 2 = 1, then D needs to create in total at least n − 1 links: |E 1 | + |E 2 | ≥ n − 1. erefore, an optimal strategy is E 1 = ∅ and |E 2 | = n − 1. Since E 1 = ∅, the optimal strategy of A is E A = ∅.
In Situation 2, (N, E 1 ) is connected, and thus |E 1 | ≥ n − 1. Further, 1 E 1 = 1 and 1 E 1 \E A = 0, and thus |E A | ≥ 1. Since 1 − τ − τ R > (n − 1)c D , then A should remove the minimum number of links to disconnect the network, and we obtain the result. 
Regime 2:
We now consider the case where D has incentive, at phase τ + τ R , to heal the network if at most k links are required to reconnect it,
We study the potential SPE in Situations 3, 4 and 5 in Lemma 4. . Suppose that an SPE occurs in Situation 5. Since the network is always disconnected, then U D = −c D (|E 1 | + |E 2 |). e maximum utility is obtained when
In Situation 4, since any connected network contains at least n − 1 links, then the maximum utility of D is U D (E 1 , E 2 , E A ) = (1 −τ −τ R ) −c D (n − 1) < 0. us, D is be er o with a null strategy (occurring in Situation 5).
In Situation 3, since 1 E 1 = 1 then |E 1 | ≥ n − 1. D can achieves utility value τ −(n −1)c D by playing a tree network. Since 1 E 1 \E A 1 E 1 then |E A | ≥ 1 and U A ≤ 1 − τ − c A . e bound is achieved by a acking any one link created by D. We further can show that A needs to a ack k +1 links such that D will not heal the network.
In the following, we focus on the SPEs in Situations 1 and 2. In both cases, 1 E 1 = 1. us, D creates initially a connected network. For each node i ∈ N , let d i be its degree. e potential best response strategies of A to E 1 are summarized as follows:
(i) Either A does not a ack and obtains a utility of U (i)
(ii) Or A a acks su ciently many links so that the network admits 2 components, i.e., A a acks exactly min 1≤i ≤n d i links to disconnect a node of minimal degree. en, D heals the network by constructing 1 link, and A receives utility U
(ii)
(iii) Or A a acks su ciently many links so that the network admits + 2 components, for some su ciently large (whose exact value is discussed in the following two lemmas). en, D does not heal the network, and A receives utility U
Note that any intermediate value of components in the range 2; + 2 cannot happen at SPE since it amounts to a lower utility for A. For convenience, We thus denote
and k
Note that k R A (resp. k H A ) corresponds to the maximal number of a acks that A is willing to deploy to disconnect the network at phase τ R (resp. 1 − τ ) so that U 
Furthermore, it occurs only if c A ≤ τ R and
At an SPE in Situation 2, the utility of D is of the form
It is a best strategy if:
• It is the best strategy of D to heal the network at time τ + τ R , i.e., 1
= k, and k is the maximum number of links that D can create at time τ + τ R at an SPE.
• D receives a be er reward than by playing its best strategy in Situation 3, i.e., 1
For any SPE in Situation 2, we can write |E 1 | = n − 1 + α and |E 2 | ≤ k − α, for some α < k. For Situation 2, we obtain U
Since at τ + τ R , D can create at most k − α links, then the goal of A in case (iii) is to create at least = k − α + 2 components in the network (that is, to create a k −α + 1 cut). Hence, D constructs E 1 in a way that at least k A +(min 1≤i ≤n d i ) links need to be removed so that the network consists of k + 2 − α components.
We denote k :=
and
. en, for any E 1 , consider the following a ack: rst remove α links so that the resulting network is a tree and then remove k 2 + 1 − α links. en, the resulting network has exactly n − 2 −k +α links, that is, it has n − (n − 2 −k +α) = k −α + 2 components and is obtained using k
, then we consider the strategy that consists for D to create a line network at time 0. en to create k + 2 components, A would need to remove k + 1 links. However, due to k > k A + 1, it is not a best response for A. e best response for A is to a ack exactly one link (one being adjacent to one of the nodes with degree 1). en, the best strategy for D is to recreate this compromised link at time τ + τ R which is an SPE. It is strategic as it minimizes the number of created links. All other SPEs, i.e., trees created at time 0 and choices of the link to remove and the one to heal, yield the same payo s for both players.
e following lemma characterizes the SPE in Situation 1:
Otherwise, the unique SPE is such that
greater than the utility in Situation 3, i.e., τ − (n − 1)c D . us, we obtain 1 − τ ≥ (
e SPE in Situation 1 satis es U
A . us, the goal of D is to create a network with the minimal cost such that all nodes have a degree of at least 
Denote
Suppose that at phase 0, D constructs a network with (n − 1) + k links for some
Consider the strategy for A that consists in a acking randomly k H A links. Since k H A ≥ k H D ≥ k, then the resulting network has less than n − 1 links and is thus disconnected. At phase τ + τ R , D can reconstruct at most (n − 1)
, and the network is disconnected. erefore, no SPE exists in Situation
Case k > 0. If k R A ≥ 3, then k R A + 1 link removals are needed to disconnect the network, and any further additional component creation requires to remove at least 4/2 = 2 links. us, at least 2k + k R A + 1 link removals are necessary so that the network has k + 2 components. us, A does not a ack the network. If k R A = 2, and if k ≤ n 2 , then at least k R A + 1 + 2k link removals are required, and otherwise k R A + 1 + n 2 + (k − n 2 ) link removals are necessary. us, A does not a ack the network.
A only needs to disconnect the network since D does not heal. us, D creates an (N, k H A + 1) Harary network at phase 0. Suppose that k R A = 0. en if k H A = k, then D creates a tree network which is an optimal strategy.
Otherwise, k H A = k + 1 in which case D creates a ring network. Finally, suppose that k R A = 1. If k H A = k +1, then the ring network, i.e., the (N, 2)-Harary network, is optimal for D. Otherwise, if k H A = k + 2, then D needs to create a network of minimal cost such that no k cut exists with k + 1 links. To this end, we consider the following network. For each i ∈ N , we create a link between nodes i and (i + 1) mod n (ring network). en, we connect node k to node 2k, and connect node 2k to node 3k, and so on. If n k is even, then we connect node k n k to node 0. Otherwise, we connect node 0 to any node of the network excluding 1 and n − 1.
e resulting network contains no k cut of size k + 1 links and is minimal in terms of the number of links. e resulting utility for D
e results of Lemmas 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 are summarized in Table 3 . 
δ is given by Eq. (3)).
CASE STUDIES
In this section, we use a case study of UAV-enabled communication networks to corroborate the obtained results. UAVs become an emerging technology to serve as communication relays, especially in disaster recovery scenarios in which the existing communication infrastructures are out of service [11] . In the following, we consider a team of n = 10 UAVs. e unitary costs of creating and compromising a communication link between UAVs for the operator/defender and adversary are c D = 1/20 and c A = 1/8, respectively. When the adversary a acks the network at phase τ = 0.3, and the defender heals it a er τ R = 0.2, the UAV-enabled communication network con guration at SPE is shown in Fig. 2 which admits a tree structure, and A does not a ack the network at SPE. In addition, the utilities for D and A at SPE with τ R ∈ [0, 0.6] are shown in Fig. 3 . e SPE encounters switching with di erent τ R . As τ R increases, the UAV network operator needs to allocate more link resources to secure the network. Otherwise, the a acker has an incentive to compromise the communication links with a positive payo . Speci cally, when τ R < 0.375, A does not a ack the UAV network, and D obtains a positive utility by constructing a securely connected network. When 0.375 < τ R < 0.5, the defender creates a connected network with the minimum e ort, i.e., 9 links, at phase 0. In this interval, the a acker will successfully compromise the system during phase [τ , τ + τ R ], and the defender heals the network a erward. When τ R exceeds 0.5, the defender does not either protect or heal the network. e reason is that larger τ R provides more incentives for the a acker to compromise the links and receive a be er payo . is also indicates that agile resilience (small τ R ) is critical in mitigating cyber threats in the infrastructure networks.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have established a two-player three-stage dynamic game for the infrastructure network protection and recovery. We have characterized the strategic strategies of the network defender and the a acker by analyzing the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the game. With a case study on UAV-enabled communication networks for disaster recovery, we have observed that with an agile response to the a ack, the defender can obtain a positive utility by creating a securely connected infrastructure network. Furthermore, a higher level resilience saves link resources for the defender and yields a be er payo . In addition, a longer duration between the a ack and recovery phases induces a higher level of cyber threats to the infrastructures. Future work would include the extension of the network formation problem to interdependent networks and dynamic games with incomplete information.
